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Researchers often identify degree effects by including degree attainment (D) and years of 
schooling (S) in a wage model, yet the source of independent variation in these measures is 
not well understood. We argue that S is negatively correlated with ability among degree-
holders because the most able graduate the fastest, while a positive correlation exists among 
dropouts because the most able benefit from increased schooling. Using data from the 
NLSY79, we find support for this explanation, and we reject the notion that the independent 
variation in S and D reflects reporting error. 
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1.  Introduction 
A central issue in labor economics is why credentialed workers (those with high school 
diplomas or college degrees) earn more than their non-credentialed counterparts.  Such degree 
effects are consistent with sorting models of education (Arrow 1973, Spence 1973, Stiglitz 1975, 
Weiss 1983) in which employers use credentials to identify workers with desirable traits that 
cannot be directly observed.
1 Degree effects are also generated by human capital models (Becker 
1964, Card 1995, 1999) if good learners are the ones who stay in school long enough to earn 
credentials, or if “lumpiness” in the learning process leads to more skill acquisition in degree 
years than in preceding years (Chiswick 1973, Lange and Topel 2006).  Despite difficulties in 
distinguishing between these two competing models, the “sorting versus human capital” debate 
has dominated the degree effects literature for over 30 years.   
Largely overlooked in this debate is the role of functional form in the interpretation of 
degree effects. In the earliest empirical studies (Hungerford and Solon 1987, Taubman and 
Wales 1973), degree effects were identified by including a nonlinear function of years of school 
(S) or categorical measures of degree attainment (D) in a log-wage model.  More recently, 
analysts have taken advantage of richer survey data to implement a different identification 
strategy: rather than include S or D in their wage models, they control for both S and D (Arkes 
1999, Ferrer and Riddell 2002, Frazis 1993, Jaeger and Page 1996, Park 1999).  The 
interpretation of the resulting degree effects—defined as the wage gap between credentialed and 
non-credentialed workers conditional on years of schooling—is the focus of our analysis. 
When both S and D are included in a wage model, degree effects are identified because 
individuals with a given amount of schooling differ in their degree status or, stated differently, 
because years of schooling vary among individuals within a given degree category.  We begin by 
considering how individuals’ schooling decisions could generate the necessary variation in S and 
D.  Among orthodox human capital and sorting models, only Weiss’s (1983) “sorting-cum-
learning” model explains why S and D might vary independently.
2  In Weiss’s model, individuals 
attend school for S years and then take a test.  High-ability individuals pass the test and earn a 
                                                 
1Following Weiss (1995), we use the term “sorting” to refer to both signaling and screening versions of 
the models.   
2In other models (e.g., Arrow 1973, Becker 1964, Card 1999, Spence 1973, Stiglitz 1975) schooling 
attainment is a one-dimensional construct; whether it is measured as highest grade completed or highest 
degree received is left to survey designers and data analysts.     2
degree, while low-ability individuals terminate their schooling without a degree.  While this 
behavioral framework justifies the inclusion of S and D in a wage model, it is inconsistent with 
the fact that individuals take varying amounts of time to earn identical degrees.   
The empirical literature provides a number of explanations for why “time to degree” 
might vary across individuals.  After documenting that the time typically needed to earn a 
college degree increased significantly between the 1970s and 1990s, Bound et al. (2007), Bound 
and Turner (2007), and Turner (2004) consider such explanatory factors as (i) declines in student 
preparedness as more high school graduates were drawn into college; (ii) corresponding declines 
in course availability and other college resources that led to delays in degree completion; and 
(iii) credit constraints that led to increased in-school employment and enrollment interruptions 
among college students.  Analyses of employment among high school and college students 
(Light 1999, 2001; Oettinger 1999; Parent 2006; Ruhm 1997; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 
2003) and college transfer patterns (Hilmer 1997, 2000; Light and Strayer 2004; McCormick and 
Carroll 1997) provide additional insights into why students might vary in their time to degree 
completion. 
To our knowledge, neither the theoretical nor empirical literature has considered a 
particular pattern that we find in the data:  wages increase with years of school (S) among both 
high school and college dropouts, but decrease in S among both high school and college 
graduates.  Given the lack of compelling explanations for the type of variation in S and D that 
would generate this particular pattern, we present a simple human capital model in which (i) 
individuals differ in ability, (ii) high-ability individuals acquire more skill than low-ability 
individuals during each year of school, (iii) degrees are awarded once a given skill threshold is 
reached, and (iv) lumpiness in learning causes individuals with varying ability levels to terminate 
their schooling upon crossing an identical degree threshold.  In addition to predicting that high-
ability individuals earn degrees and low-ability individuals do not, this model demonstrates how 
ability might be negatively correlated with time spent in school among degree-holders:  everyone 
in this population reaches the same level of achievement, but the most able reach the threshold in 
the shortest time.  Among individuals who do not earn a degree, however, those with the most 
ability stay in school the longest because they benefit from additional skill investments.   
Our schooling model provides a rationale for including both S and D in the log-wage 
function.  Moreover, it leads us to specify a wage function in which the S slope varies across   3
degree categories, and it predicts that the S slope is negative for degree holders (e.g., college 
graduates) and positive for nondegree-holders (e.g., college dropouts).  In contrast, earlier studies 
include independent dummy variables for each degree category (D) and for schooling (S) (Arkes 
1999, Ferrer and Riddell 2002, Frazis 1993, Jaeger and Page 1996, Park 1999), or they specify a 
fully-interacted model with a dummy variable for every S-D cell (Jaeger and Page 1996, Park 
1999).   In the absence of an explicit theoretical justification for these functional forms, it is 
difficult to interpret the estimates.
3    
In estimating our log-wage model with data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth, we consider two additional issues.  First, we acknowledge that the independent 
variation in S and D used for identification can arise from reporting errors as well as from the 
optimizing behavior described by our model.  Because models that control for both S and D rely 
on variation in S within each degree category, the estimates are more vulnerable to “noise” than 
are estimates that rely on the total variation in the data.  To contend with measurement error, we 
reestimate our wage equations with S and D data that are judged to be “clean” to determine 
whether seemingly error-ridden observations are driving our results.  While misreporting of both 
S and D has been widely explored (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994, Black et al. 2000, Bound et 
al. 2001, Flores-Lagunes and Light 2006, Kane et al. 1999), estimates from the “clean” sample 
suggest that measurement error is not an important source of the independent variation in S and 
D used to identify degree effects.   
Second, we argue that the most common measure of years of school—namely, highest 
grade completed—is not always the preferred measure.  For degree holders, we wish to know 
how long it takes to earn the credential.  However, time to completion is not fully captured by 
“highest grade completed” if the latter measures credits earned toward a degree—for example, 
high school graduates may report having completed grade 12 regardless of whether they earned 
their diploma in three, four, or five years. For this reason, “age at school exit” is our preferred 
measure of time spent in school for degree-holders.  Among dropouts, where our goal is to 
measure the skill acquisition that takes place prior to school exit, the opposite is true: “highest 
                                                 
3In fact, existing estimates appear to be highly sensitive to functional form.  When controlling for (non-
interacted) dummy variables for each degree level and each year of schooling, Jaeger and Page (1996) 
predict a gap in log wages of 0.16 between bachelor’s degree holders and college dropouts. When 
controlling for dummy variables for every S-D cell, they predict the same gap in log wages (holding S 
constant at 16) to be 75% higher.   4
grade completed” (that is, progress made towards a degree) is likely to be a better measure than 
“age at school exit.”  In light of these concerns, we use both highest grade completed and age at 
school exit (conditional on work experience gained while in school) as alternative measures of S 
in our wage models.  
Our estimates reveal that the marginal effect of S varies across degree categories in the 
systematic manner predicted by our model: each year of S  is associated with higher wages 
among high school and college dropouts, and with lower wages among high school and college 
graduates.  For the two dropout categories, the positive slope is larger in magnitude (ranging 
from 0.02 to 0.05) and more precisely estimated when S is measured as highest grade completed 
than when S is measured as age at school exit.  For the two degree categories, the negative 
estimates (ranging from -0.002 to -0.03) become much more precise when we measure S as age 
at school exit rather than as highest grade completed.  The independent variation in S and D 
observed in the data appears to reflect important skill differences among individuals with a 
common degree status. By recasting degree effects as “time in school” effects conditional on D, 
we learn that dropouts who stay in school the longest are the most highly skilled of their type, as 
are graduates who complete their degrees in the shortest time.   
2.  Schooling Model  
Our objective is to show time spent in school (S) varies among individuals with a given 
degree status (D) and, in particular, why S is positively (negatively) correlated with ability 
among dropouts (graduates). We begin with a straightforward extension of Card’s (1995, 1999) 
formalization of Becker’s (1964) seminal model, in which individuals terminate their schooling 
when the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost.  Becker (1964) and Card (1995, 1999) 
consider a single observed dimension—years of schooling (S)—in which to assess individuals:  
the more S a worker has, the more skill and ability he is expected to embody.  We augment this 
framework by assuming a degree is awarded to any individual who crosses a given skill 
threshold.  We also assume that “lumpiness” in learning leads to a discontinuity in the human 
capital production function at the degree threshold.  The discontinuity induces individuals with a 
range of abilities to terminate their schooling upon earning the degree—however, the more able 
among this group reach the threshold sooner than their less-able counterparts because they 
acquire skill at a faster rate.  Individuals who lack the ability to earn a degree never face the 
discontinuity, and instead make their schooling decision precisely as described in the Becker and   5
Card models.  Thus, dropouts exhibit the familiar pattern in which more able individuals stay in 
school longer than less able individuals. 
To formalize these arguments, we consider a group of individuals who are heterogeneous 
with respect to their innate ability, face no ex ante uncertainty about their ability, and are 
identical with respect to all cost-related factors such as discount rates and tastes.  In addition, we 
assume that schools offer a single, identical degree and are essentially indistinguishable from one 
another—that is, we abstract from the role of school characteristics and programs of study in 
affecting how much a given individual will learn in a given amount of time.  We make these 
simplifying assumptions in order to highlight the key features of our model.  After presenting the 
model in 2.A, we discuss in 2.B the extent to which these “real world” complexities might 
influence students’ schooling decisions and, in turn, the data that we analyze in subsequent 
sections.  
A. Effects of “Lumpiness” in Learning on Schooling Decisions 
We assume individual i chooses years of schooling (Si) to maximize the utility function  
) 1 (                                                          , ) | ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( i i i i i i i rS A S g S C S K S K U − = − =  
where Ki and Ai represent individual-specific acquired skill and innate ability, respectively, and r 
is the discount rate. The function K(Si)=g(Si|Ai) is the human capital production function that 
describes how each additional year of school translates into additional skill, and C(Si)=rSi is the 
associated cost function.  In contrast to Card’s (1995, 1999) formulation, we include skill, rather 
than earnings, as an argument in the utility function; the individual seeks to maximize the 
discounted, present value of skill which, along with ability, determines his post-school earnings.
4  
The substitution of Ki for earnings allows us to highlight the relationship between years of school 
and degree attainment, which we assume occurs whenever skill reaches the threshold K
D.   
Following Card (1995, 1999), we assume skill increases with S at a decreasing rate, and that the 
marginal benefit of S increases in A.  However, we also assume that a discontinuity arises in 
g(Si|Ai) as the threshold K
D is approached. This discontinuity only affects individuals whose 
ability is high enough to enable them to attain a degree, so we defer further discussion of this 
feature until we consider these individuals’ schooling decisions.   
                                                 
4We assume, as does Card (1995, 1999), that agents do not choose their optimal schooling level with an 
eye toward possible interactions between schooling attainment and post-school skill investments.  Thus, 
they focus on the skill (and wages) that will potentially prevail at the outset of the career.      6
In figure 1, we illustrate the schooling decisions of two individuals with relatively low 
levels of ability.  Regardless of how long these individuals stay in school, their skill level does 
not get close enough to the threshold K
D for “lumpiness” in learning to come into play.  As a 
result, both individuals simply choose the schooling level at which the slope of their (continuous) 
production path equals the constant marginal cost r.  For the individual with ability level A1, this 
schooling level is S1; for his counterpart with the higher ability level A2, the optimal schooling 
level is S 2.  In short, individuals in this range of the ability distribution—all of whom leave 
school without degrees—exhibit the familiar pattern (Becker 1964, Card 1995, 1999) of positive 
correlation between ability, years of school, and skill. 
Next, we consider the schooling decisions of two individuals whose ability levels are 
sufficiently high to make degree attainment a possibility.   Figure 2 shows that in the absence of 
any discontinuity, the individual with ability A3 finds his optimum at point b', while  the 
individual with higher ability A4 chooses a'.  As each individual comes arbitrarily close to skill 
threshold  K
D, however, his path shifts upward by a fixed amount. The upward shift in the 
function (shown by the solid lines) is caused by “lumpiness” in learning—that is, individuals 
experience a contemporaneous increment in their skill level once they complete a program of 
study.  This feature of the learning process was first suggested by Chiswick (1973) to explain 
how degree attainment could be associated with a larger wage increment than nondegree years in 
the absence of job market signaling.   
For the “type A4” individual, the discontinuity shown in figure 2 happens to occur at the 
skill level associated with S4 years of school, which is the point at which he would terminate his 
schooling in the absence of a discontinuity.  The individual reaches an optimum (point a) on the 
higher path, and leaves school with a degree after S4 years.  The discontinuity induces the lower 
ability individual to move to point b (i.e., leave school with a degree after S3 years) rather than 
b'.  More generally, individuals in this ability range can choose to stay in school longer in order 
to exploit the benefits of “lumpiness” in learning, but the most able among them earn their 
degrees the fastest. 
Thus far, we have assumed that (i) “lumpiness” in learning produces a contemporaneous 
skill boost but does not affect the marginal benefit of S, and (ii) marginal cost is constant.  If 
either assumption is relaxed, the most able individuals might opt to leave school sooner in 
response to the discontinuity—that is, they might terminate their schooling upon earning the   7
degree rather than stay in school for a year or two beyond the degree.  This scenario is shown in 
figure 3, where we compare the “type A3” individual from figure 2 to a highly able “type A5” 
individual, where A5 >A4 >A3.  In the absence of a discontinuity, the individual with ability A5 
would proceed beyond skill level K
D to point a'.
5   If his production path not only shifts upward 
but also flattens, as shown in figure 3, he chooses point a.  In other words, he opts not to proceed 
beyond the degree if the productivity burst associated with completing skill set K
D is followed by 
a productivity slowdown as he begins acquiring the next skill set.  Alternatively, if r increases 
once K
D is reached—because continued schooling is more difficult to fund or tastes change once 
a degree is obtained—the individual could also opt for point a.   If such changes in the marginal 
benefit and/or marginal cost of school accompany “lumpiness” in learning, the result is that 
“type  A5” individuals join the “type A3” and “type A4” individuals in leaving school upon 
crossing the degree threshold.  This leads to even more variation in S among individuals with 
identical degrees, while maintaining a negative relationship between S and A. 
B. Additional Considerations 
Our simple extension of Card’s (1995, 1999) schooling model demonstrates how 
particular patterns in the data might arise.   While the pattern for dropouts (a positive relationship 
between S and A) emerges directly from the Card model, the reverse pattern for graduates is 
generated because we assume “lumpiness” in learning in conjunction with the notion that 
degrees are awarded when a given skill level is reached.  The notion that S might represent 
something different for graduates than for dropouts—and, as we demonstrate in section 5, the 
fact that the dropout-graduate contrast holds at both the high school and college level—appears 
not to have been analyzed elsewhere in the literature.   
The literature has extensively explored the broader issue of why “time in school” and 
“time to degree” (especially college degree) vary across individuals.  Becker (1964) and Card 
(1995, 1999) describe precisely how factors affecting both marginal benefit and marginal cost 
affect a given individual’s schooling attainment.  Bound et al. (2007), Bound and Turner (2007), 
and Turner (2004) consider a range of factors to explain why the timing of college degree 
attainment slowed during the 1970s and 1980s.  Research on the employment of high school and 
                                                 
5Point a' in figure 3 corresponds to staying in school beyond the single degree program that we assume is 
available.  Clearly, we could extend our framework to include a higher degree, in which case the 
production function would contain another discontinuity at a skill level beyond K
D; point a' would then 
correspond to dropping out of this higher degree program.   8
college students (Light 1999, 2001; Oettinger 1999; Parent 2006; Ruhm 1997; Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner 2003) and college transfer patterns (Hilmer 1997, 2000; Light and Strayer 2004; 
McCormick and Carroll 1997) provide additional explanations for why years of school would 
vary across students.  An exhaustive exploration of why S would vary among individuals in a 
given degree/dropout category is beyond the scope of this study, but we consider a subset of 
issues that are potentially relevant to the interpretation of our findings.  
In figures 1-2, we abstract entirely from individual heterogeneity in the marginal cost of 
school. While individual differences in preferences and funding opportunities unquestionably 
affect who stays in school the longest and who obtains a degree, these factors affect the empirical 
relationship between S, D, and wages only if they are related to labor market productivity.  The 
key issue for our analysis is that financially constrained students are the most likely to 
accumulate in-school employment experience, which has been shown in some studies (e.g., Light 
2001; Ruhm 1997) to have a direct effect on post-school earnings.  Thus, variation in S among 
individuals with a given degree status might reflect not only variation in ability, as assumed by 
our model, but variation in in-school experience as well.  In estimating our wage models, we 
include detailed measures of both in-school and post-school work experience.  This enables us to 
assess the (degree-specific) effect of S on log-wages net of the effect of work experience.  
By assuming that skill (K
D) is identical among degree-holders, we also abstract from the 
fact that school characteristics and programs of study can affect how much is learned, 
conditional on student ability or time spent in school; an extensive literature explores the effects 
of school quality and college major on subsequent earnings (e.g., Altonji et al. 2005, 
Arcidiacono 2004, Brewer et al. 1999, Dale and Krueger 2002).  A related issue is that college 
quality can affect S if, for example, students at resource-constrained colleges are forced to delay 
their degree completion because of enrollment limits in courses needed to graduate.  This 
phenomenon is shown by Bound et al. (2007) and Bound and Turner (2007) to be an important 
determinant of secular increases in time to college degree completion, and it can potentially 
affect cross-sectional variation in S as well. Of course, “resource squeezes” on some college 
campuses cannot explain variation in S among high school graduates as well as college 
graduates, nor can it explain why S is wage enhancing among college dropouts.  Nonetheless, we 
acknowledge that for college graduates, S can be negatively correlated with college quality as 
well as individual ability.   9
Our theoretical framework also makes the simplifying assumption that individuals face 
no uncertainty about their own abilities.  Although this assumption is imposed more often than 
not in the schooling literature, uncertainty is worth discussing because it has been invoked by 
Chiswick (1973) and Lange and Topel (2006) to explain how degree effects could arise in the 
absence of job market signaling or “lumpiness” in skill acquisition.  The argument is that 
individuals discover their true ability over time, and that the least able drop out of school in 
response to this discovery while the more able—who learn more than the less able during every 
year of school—remain in school to complete the degree.  We acknowledge that individuals may 
discover their true ability while in school, and that the degree effects that we estimate in section 
5 might reflect this type of selection-on-ability in addition to “lumpiness” in learning.
6  However, 
neither of these existing studies helps us understand why S and D vary independently, or why the 
relationship between S and ability differs for graduates and dropouts. 
3.  Econometric strategy 
In section 2, we assumed that each individual chooses his years of school (S) to maximize 
acquired skill (K) which, in conjunction with innate ability (A), determines his post-school 
“starting” wage.  Employers cannot observe K and A directly, but they can observe degree status 
and S.  Under the assumptions of our model, these factors fully describe ability and skill. 
To incorporate these factors into an estimable wage model, we specify a fairly standard 
function that allows log-wages to evolve with experience, and schooling attainment to affect the 
intercept (but not the experience slope) of the age-earnings path (Mincer 1974).  Our theoretical 
discussion calls for a functional form that allows the intercept of the log-wage path to increase 
with each successive degree category and to change with years of schooling within each 
category.  Thus, we specify the following wage function:  









ki k i u Z S D D Y + + + = ∑ ∑
= =
π δ α  
where  i Y  is the natural logarithm of the average hourly wage for individual i,  ki D  is a vector of 
                                                 
6The degree effects that we estimate can also reflect job market signaling.  In fact, students might use 
both degree attainment and speed of completion as a multi-dimensional signal of their ability, as 
suggested by Groot and Oosterbeek (1994).  In light of recent evidence (Lange 2007) that employers learn 
workers’ true ability quite quickly—and that, as a result, signaling appears to play a relatively minor 
role—we focus on a strictly human capital explanation for the patterns seen in the data. 
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dummy variables identifying degree categories,  i S  is time in school,  i Z is a vector of additional 
covariates including cumulative labor market experience, and  i u  represents unobserved factors.  
In contrast to our earlier, simplifying assumption that workers earn a single degree upon reaching 
a given skill threshold, we now allow for two successive degrees.  Specifically,  k D  distinguishes 
between high school dropouts (D1), high school graduates (D2), college dropouts (D3), and 
college graduates (D4).
7   Our model predicts that log-wages increase monotonically with each 
successive degree  ) ( 4 3 2 1 α α α α < < < , and that the effect of S  on these degree effects is 
positive for dropouts  , 0 ( 1 > δ  ) 0 3 > δ and negative for degree-holders  ) 0 , 0 ( 4 2 < < δ δ .   
It is worth reiterating that our specification is not generally used in the degree effects 
literature.  The orthodox approach—often dictated by a lack of independent data on S and D—is 
to use a spline function or step function in S and omit separate measures of D (Belman and 
Heywood 1991, Hungerford and Solon 1987).  Among studies that control for both S and D, 
most include degree dummies and an independent (noninteracted) function of S (Arkes 1999, 
Ferrer and Riddell 2002, Frazis 1993, Jaeger and Page 1996, Park 1999).  This is equivalent to 
imposing the restriction  4 3 2 1 δ δ δ δ = = = , although some studies relax our restriction that Y is a 
linear function of S.  Jaeger and Page (1996) and Park (1999) propose alternative specifications 
that allow for interactions between S and D, but they use an extremely flexible functional form 
that includes a parameter for every year-of-schooling/degree combination.  We propose equation 
(2) as the most parsimonious way to capture the D-S-specific intercepts that are consistent with 
our schooling model. 
As long as the covariates  , , i ki S D and  i Z  are complete and accurate representations of the 
factors that determine wages in the labor market, we can use ordinary least squares (OLS) to 
estimate the parameters in equation (2).  While we maintain the assumption that our covariates 
are sufficient statistics for innate ability and acquired skill (and that wages are based on these 
factors), we cannot assume that our survey data are reported without error. Unfortunately, the 
instrumental variables and generalized method of moments estimators that are often used to 
account for measurement error in S or D (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994, Black et al. 2000, 
                                                 
7The sample used to estimate equation (2) includes individuals who proceed beyond a college (bachelor’s) 
degree to attend a wide variety of graduate programs. We experiment with combining these individuals 
into a fifth (and sixth) degree category and, alternatively, dropping them from the sample.  We discuss 
these issues, as well as other issues related to our degree categories, in section 4.   11
Flores-Lagunes and Light 2006, Kane et al. 1999) are inappropriate for our application because 
they allow only one covariate to be reported with error, and they require two, independent 
reports for the error-ridden variable.
8 In the absence of a tractable estimation strategy that 
accounts for measurement error in both S and D, we compare estimates from our primary sample 
to those from an alternative sample of seemingly “clean” responses to determine whether our 
results are sensitive to the inclusion of seemingly-erroneous data.
9 
The notation used in equation (2) implies that we use cross-sectional data for estimation 
and, in fact, a cross-section composed of each individual’s post-school “starting wage” is our 
primary sample.  We also use a panel sample consisting of annual wages reported by each 
sample member from school exit to the end of the observation period.  We use ordinary least 
squares to estimate all models, but when using the panel sample we correct the standard errors 
for nonindependence across observations for a given worker.  All models are estimated after 
transforming the data into deviations from sample-specific grand means.  We describe each 
sample in section 4.   
4. Data  
A. Sample Selection and Variable Definitions 
  We use data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) to 
estimate the wage functions described in section 3.  The NLSY79 began in 1979 with a sample 
of 12,686 youth born in 1957-64, and it remains in progress today.  Respondents were 
interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994 and biennially thereafter; 2004 is the last year for which 
data were available when we carried out the analysis.  The NLSY79 is an ideal source of data for 
our analysis because respondents report their highest grade completed, dates of enrollment, and 
degree attainment; the survey also provides unusually detailed information on labor market 
activities, which enables us to net out the potentially confounding effects of work experience 
                                                 
8We have an independent report of high school graduation status for a subset of respondents for whom 
high school transcripts were collected, but the NLSY79 does not provide similar validation data for 
college attendance and degrees.  Similarly, we have sibling-reported “highest grade completed” for 
respondents with in-sample siblings, but these reports pre-date final schooling attainment for many 
respondents. 
9A potentially useful method for addressing measurement error in a categorical variable such as D is the 
Lee and Porter (1984) switching regression model with imperfect regime (degree) classification. We also 
extend this model to our application, and find no evidence that degree reporting errors have an important 
effect on the estimates reported in section 5. 
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gained while in school.  
The first step in our data creation process is to identify each respondent’s chronological 
sequence of diplomas and degrees received, along with the date when each credential was 
awarded.  If an individual attended high school, college, or graduate school without earning a 
diploma or degree, we include his attendance spell and dropout date in the degree sequence.  To 
construct this sequence, we use the following self-reported information: (i) whether the 
respondent holds a high school diploma or has passed the general educational development test 
(GED) at the date of the interview and, if so, the month and year of diploma/GED attainment; (ii) 
whether the respondent is enrolled in school at the time of the interview and, if not, the month 
and year of his last enrollment; (iii) the respondent’s enrollment status in every month since the 
last interview; (iv) the month/year the respondent last attended his first, second, and third most 
recent colleges; and (v) the type and month/year of receipt of as many as three diplomas and 
degrees or, in earlier survey years, of the highest degree.
10   When identical diplomas or degrees 
are reported multiple times, we generally use the first-reported date; we resort to subsequently-
reported dates or to the enrollment timelines when information is missing.   
We use this information to place each respondent into one of five categories:  high school 
dropout, high school graduate, college dropout, college graduate (i.e., bachelor’s degree 
recipient) or graduate degree recipient.   Those respondents who complete their schooling 
without interruption are classified according to their “final” degree or dropout status.  When 
individuals receive their schooling discontinuously, we assign them the dropout/degree status 
that prevails the first time they leave school for at least 18 months.  We are limited in our ability 
to form post-bachelor’s degree categories because our theoretical model assumes that individuals 
holding a given degree are homogeneous with respect to acquired skill, and we lack the sample 
size to define separate categories for holders of master’s, professional, and doctoral degrees.  In 
addition, we are unable to identify the degree programs being pursued by graduate school 
dropouts.  Thus, we combine all graduate degree holders—who make up 2.7% of the sample—
into a single category (D5), but we do not include interactions between D5 and S in our wage 
model. Graduate school dropouts remain in our sample as college graduates if they are 
                                                 
10Monthly enrollment status questions (item iii) were asked in every interview except the first, and 
questions about degree types and dates (item v) were asked every year except 1985-87.  All other sets of 
questions were included in every survey year, although many were only asked of respondents who 
indicated via a lead-in question whether they had attended school since the last interview.     13
nonenrolled for at least 18 months between college and graduate school, and report a wage 
during the interim.  As we demonstrate in section 5, our findings are unaffected by whether we 
categorize graduate students in this fashion, or eliminate them from the sample altogether; 
additional, unreported experiments, such as moving graduate school dropouts into a sixth 
category and adding interactions between S and the post-college degree categories, also proved 
not to affect our inferences. 
We choose not to segment the college dropout category into two-year college dropouts, 
two-year college graduates, and four-year college dropouts because these groups are 
conceptually indistinct, given the frequent use of two-year colleges as “stepping stones” to four-
year colleges (Hilmer 1997, Light and Strayer 2004, Rouse 1995).   For example, we would 
hesitate to argue that a student who earns an associate’s degree in two years and then spends one 
year at a four-year college differs in ability from a student who enrolls at a four-year college for 
three years.  We substantiate this decision in section 5 by demonstrating that eliminating two-
year degree-holders from the sample does not significantly affect our estimates.  We also show 
that our inferences do not depend on whether we treat individuals with a GED as high school 
dropouts (our default classification) or high school graduates. 
After classifying each sample member with respect to highest degree, the second step in 
our data creation process is to identify the corresponding years of school.  During each interview, 
respondents are asked to report their current “highest grade completed” if they have attended 
school since the last interview.  We use the value reported during the first interview after the 
degree or dropout date as one measure of “time in school,” which we now refer to as S1.  As an 
alternative measure of “time in school,” we use the degree or dropout date in conjunction with 
the respondent’s birth date to determine the age (measured to the nearest month) at which he or 
she left school; we refer to this variable as S2.    
The degree or dropout date used to define S2 also serves as the career start date.  With 
this date in hand, the next step in our data creation process is to select alternative samples of 
post-school wages.  Our cross-sectional “starting wage” sample uses the first wage reported after 
the degree is awarded or the individual drops out of school.  Our “all wages” sample includes 
that same wage, plus a maximum of one wage per year reported by the individual over the 
remainder of the panel, which ends when he reenrolls in school or is last observed.  Given our 
strategy of allowing the intercept of the age-earning profile to depend on an individual’s D-S   14
combination, each wage sample has its own advantage.  The “all wages” sample provides more 
data with which to fit the log-wage path.  The “starting wage” sample contains relatively little 
variation in post-school work experience, which minimizes the possibility that D and S are 
correlated with unmeasured components of work experience due, perhaps, to the most able 
workers investing more intensively in on-the-job training than less able workers.   
The final step in our data creation process is to define the remaining variables.  Our 
dependent variable is the log of the average hourly wage, divided by the consumer price index 
(CPI-U).   In addition to the time-invariant variables D and S (S1 and S2), we include dummy 
variables identifying male, black, and Hispanic sample members; the default racial/ethnic 
category is individuals who are nonblack, non-Hispanic (“white”).  The time-varying covariates 
include a set of dummy variables indicating the calendar year during which the wage is earned. 
We use the detailed work history information available in the NLSY79 to construct a measure of 
cumulative weeks worked from the 18
th birthday to the date when the wage is earned.  In 
addition, we use the work experience reported by 16 and 17 year olds (available for respondents 
who are younger than 18 when the survey begins) to compute average work effort at age 16-17 
as a fraction of work effort at age 18, by sex, race/ethnicity, and degree status.  We then use 
these averages to assign every sample member a measure of predicted, early experience.  We 
control for actual experience since age 18 and its square, along with predicted “early” (pre-age 
18) experience in each of our wage models. 
Our “starting wage” sample consists of a single observation for each of 11,712 
individuals.  While the original NLSY79 sample has 12,686 respondents, we eliminate 313 
individuals for whom degree status, degree/dropout dates, and/or highest grade completed cannot 
be determined.  We eliminate another 661 individuals because a post-school wage is not 
reported.   The “all wages” sample contains between one and 21 observations for the same 
11,712 individuals, for a total of 126,019 observations.   
In addition to analyzing the entire “starting wage” sample of 11,712 individuals, we also 
examine a subsample in which the schooling and degree variables are judged to be “clean.”  To 
construct this subsample, we exploit the fact that degree attainment and highest grade completed 
should conform to certain institutional norms if respondents consider their progress toward a 
degree when reporting their highest grade completed.  We expect high school dropouts to 
complete grade 11 or lower, high school graduates to complete grade 12, college dropouts to   15
complete at least grade 12 but less than grade 16, and college graduates to complete grade 16.  In 
forming a “clean” sample, we eliminate individuals if their reported S1-D combination is 
sufficiently far from these expectations:  we require S1≤12, S1=11-13, S1=12-16, S1=15-19, and 
S1≥16 for individuals in the high school dropout, high school graduate, college dropout, college 
graduate, and graduate degree categories, respectively.  This strategy eliminates roughly 3% of 
observations in each high school and college category, and 1.3% of the graduate degree holders.  
The remaining sample consists of 11,277 individuals for whom the S1 and D data are not 
necessarily error-free, but are invariably less error-ridden than the data in the larger sample.  By 
comparing estimates for our two samples, we can assess the effect of measurement error on the 
estimates.
11   We do not construct a similar “clean” sample using our alternative variable S2 (age 
at school exit) because part-time and discontinuous enrollment often delay school exit.  We 
control for these delays by including detailed experience measures in our wage model, but we 
lack clear expectations of the unconditional relationship between age at school exit and degree 
attainment. 
B.  Summary Statistics  
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations for the variables used to estimate the wage 
models for both the “starting wage” and “all wages” samples.   Table 2 contains a cross-
tabulation of “highest grade completed” (S1) and degree status (D).  It is clear from these 
distributions that S1 varies considerably within D category.  A comparison of the coefficient of 
variation across columns reveals that S1 varies far more within each dropout category than 
within each degree category; this conforms to the notion that S1 measures progress made towards 
a degree and is therefore relatively homogenous among degree-holders.  However, if we instead 
ask how often S1 falls within the “expected” range for that particular degree category (less than 
12 for high school dropouts, 12 for high school graduates, 13-15 for college dropouts, 16 for 
college graduates, and more than 16 for graduate degree holders) we find the most noise among 
the college-goers:  S1 is “as expected” for 97% of high school dropouts and 85% of high school 
graduates, but only 52% of college dropouts.  These patterns suggest that there is ample variation 
                                                 
11Our strategy is less demanding of the data than those requiring validation data (e.g., Freeman 1984), and 
more flexible than those requiring relatively simple functional forms in order to jointly estimate 
measurement error and outcome models (Black et al. 2000, Flores-Lagunes and Light 2006, Kane et al. 
1999).     16
with which to identify independent wage effects of S1 within each degree category—especially 
among dropouts—but that misreporting might be a particularly important source of this variation 
among college-goers.  
Table 3 replicates table 2, except we now use “age at school exit” (S2) in place of highest 
grade completed.  Using the coefficients of variation for comparison, it is clear that this 
alternative measure of time in school varies far more within degree category than does highest 
grade completed.  While there is no “expected” age at which individuals complete each degree 
category, given that school exit dates can be extended by part-time or interrupted enrollment, it is 
interesting to note that only 86% of high school dropouts leave school by age 18, only 53% of 
high school graduates earn their degrees at age 18, and only 32% of college graduates earn their 
degrees at age 22.  In short, age at school exit diverges from “S1 + 6” as degree attainment 
increases.   The estimates presented in section 5 will reveal whether the marginal wage effects of 
S1 and S2 differ once we condition on the in-school work experience that explains much of the 
divergence in these two measures. 
5. Findings 
Table 4 presents estimates of the degree-specific intercepts ( k α ) and D-S interaction 
terms ( k δ ) for a variety of wage model specifications, all of which use “highest grade 
completed” (S1) as our measure of time in school; additional parameter estimates for each 
specification are in table A1.  We discuss these estimates before turning to the corresponding 
estimates in tables 5 and A2 in which S1 is replaced with age at school exit (S2). 
Column 1 of table 4 reports OLS estimates of a model that restricts the four degree-
specific schooling coefficients to be equal.  The column 1 specification is representative of much 
of the existing literature (Arkes 1999, Ferrer and Riddell 2002, Frazis 1993, Jaeger and Page 
1996) in which the goal is simply to identify degree effects conditional on S1.  Based on the 
column 1 estimates, we would predict that the gap in log wages between high school graduates 
and high school dropouts is 0.005 (0.196-0.191), the corresponding gap among college graduates 
and dropouts is 0.16 (0.462-0.301), and an additional year of school is associated with a 2% 
wage boost for all workers.
12  When we allow the relationship between S1 and log wages to vary 
                                                 
12When we reestimate the model after dropping blacks and Hispanics from the sample, the difference in 
predicted log-wage for high school dropouts and high school graduates increases to 0.054.  We do not 
report additional findings based on a sample of whites because they are very similar to what is shown in   17
across degree categories (column 2), we estimate a much larger college degree effect than what 
is seen in column 1 (0.30 versus 0.16), and we reject at a 1% significance level the null 
hypothesis that the estimated S1 effects are equal across degree categories.   
Moreover, the estimates in column 2 provide support for our theoretical argument that 
wages increase (decrease) with time in school among dropouts (graduates).  The estimated D-S 
coefficients are 0.019 and 0.039 for the high school and college dropout categories, respectively, 
and an imprecisely estimated -0.002 and -0.015 for the corresponding graduates categories.   
These point estimates are consistent with the notion that time in school is positively correlated 
with ability for dropouts but negatively correlated with ability for degree-holders.   For the two 
degree categories, the imprecision of the estimated interaction terms is consistent with the 
evidence (table 2) that S1 varies less for graduates than for dropouts.  While the existing 
variation produces parameter estimates with the predicted signs, we believe “highest grade 
completed” is not the preferred measure of time in school for degree holders. 
In columns 3-5 of table 4, we assess the effects on our OLS estimates of reclassifying 
certain degree types.  In column 3, we move GED recipients from the high school dropout 
category to the high school graduate category.  This increases the predicted log-wage gap 
associated with earning a high school degree but has relatively little effect on the estimated 
interaction effects.  The estimated coefficient for the interaction between S1 and D2 reverses 
sign, but continues to be statistically insignificant.  In column 4, we eliminate two-year degree 
holders from the sample rather than include them in the college dropout category.  Eliminating 
these relatively high wage earners leads to a decrease in the estimated S1 coefficient for college 
dropouts, but does not qualitatively affect our findings.  In column 5, we eliminate individuals 
with post-college schooling from the sample.  Again, this does not alter our inferences regarding 
the estimated effects of S1 within each degree category. 
Our next task is to assess the effects of measurement error on our estimates.  In column 6 
of table 4, we report estimates based on a “clean” sample that excludes observations where the 
reported S-D combination is highly implausible (e.g., no high school diploma but S1=16, or 
S1=12 and a bachelor’s degree).   The differences between these estimates and the corresponding 
estimates in column 2 are not significantly different from zero.  Despite the fact that the standard 
errors increase (as expected) when we switch to the clean sample, the estimated S1 coefficients 
                                                                                                                                                             
tables 4-5 in all other respects.   18
associated with the two degree categories actually become larger in absolute value.   The “clean” 
estimates are consistent with the predictions of our model and with the notion that measurement 
error in S and D is relatively unimportant.   
The final column of estimates in table 4 is based on our “all wages” sample.  We 
maintain our original degree classifications and include seemingly error-ridden observations in 
this sample, so the column 7 estimates should be compared to the estimates shown in column 2.  
Qualitatively, the column 7 estimates substantiate the evidence seen in column 2:  predicted log-
wages increase with each successive degree category, and increase (decrease) with each 
additional year of school for dropouts (graduates).  Quantitatively, all four estimated coefficients 
for the S1-D interactions are slightly larger in absolute value when we use the “all wages” 
sample than when we rely on the cross-sectional sample, although the college dropout category 
is the only one for which we reject the null hypothesis of pair-wise equality across models.
13  
This comparison suggests that S might be weakly, positively correlated with unobserved factors 
that increase log-wages as the career unfolds.  Such a correlation could arise for at least two 
reasons.  First, although we implicitly argue that employers use D and S to discern worker 
productivity at the outset of the career, they may not completely learn their workers’ true abilities 
for a few years, at which point they further reward the high-S (high ability) individuals.  Altonji 
and Pierret (2001) and Lange (2007) provide evidence of this form of employer learning.   
Second, high-S (high ability) workers might gain more or “better” work experience that is not 
captured by our cumulative experience variable, or simply receive higher returns to on-the-job 
training. Because we do not allow the experience paths to differ across S-D categories, such 
“fanning out” on the basis of ability would be subsumed by our estimated intercepts.  In general, 
however, a switch to the “all wages” sample produces only minor changes to the point estimates, 
and does not significantly affect our key findings.    
  Next, we ask how our estimates change when we replace “highest grade completed” 
(S1) with “age at school exit” (S2) as our measure of time in school.  Table 5 contains estimates 
for wage models that use this alternative measure, but are otherwise identical to the 
corresponding specifications in columns 1-5 and 7 of table 4; the column 6 estimates are omitted 
from table 5 because we lack priors on the unconditional relationship between degree and age at 
                                                 
13 Proceeding in order from D1 to D4, the p-values for the tests of pair-wise equality across models are 
0.21, 0.21, 0.02 and 0.66.     19
school exit needed to select a “clean” sample.   
In comparing the estimates shown in columns 1 and 2 of table 5, we again find that the 
data reject at a 1% significance level the equal slope restriction imposed by specification 1.  
Using the preferred specification 2, we find that replacing “highest grade completed” with “age 
at school exit” has little effect on the estimated degree effects, although we now predict a slightly 
larger wage gap between college dropouts and high school graduates than what is seen in table 4.  
However, switching schooling measures has a significant effect on the estimated coefficients for 
the S-D interactions.   In column 2 of table 4, we saw that the estimated S1 coefficient is positive 
(and significant) for dropouts and negative (but insignificant) for graduates. The parameter 
estimates have the same signs in table 5, but now the estimated coefficients for both dropout 
categories are essentially zero (0.002-0.003 with standard errors at least as large as the parameter 
estimates) while the estimated coefficients for the two degree categories are precisely estimated 
and, in the case of high school graduates, larger in absolute value (-0.019 versus -0.002 in table 
4).  The estimates change very little when we reclassify GED recipients as high school graduates 
(column 3), eliminate two-year degree holders (column 4) or drop individuals with post-college 
schooling (column 5).  When we switch to the “all wages” sample (specification 7), the 
estimated effect of S2 continues to be zero for the two dropout categories, but becomes larger in 
absolute value for the two degree categories—although, using conventional significance levels, 
we reject the null hypothesis of equality across models for the college graduate category only.   
To understand why our estimates are sensitive to the manner in which we measure time 
in school, it is useful to consider the two degree categories (high school and college graduates) 
separately from the two dropout categories.  Even if holders of a given degree do not have 
identical levels of acquired skill, as assumed by our theoretical model, they complete similar 
programs and earn a similar number of credits.  Consider one individual who earns a high school 
diploma at age 18, and another who earns the same diploma a year earlier.  Both should report 
their highest grade completed as 12 to reflect the fact that they completed the final year of their 
program, but their reported school exit dates should differ because one of them completed the 
program more quickly than the other.  In short, “age at school exit” is a more informative 
measure of what we wish to know about degree recipients—namely, the speed with which they 
complete a common grade or degree program.  Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the 
estimated S2 slopes in table 5 (based on “age at school exit”) predict that degree-holders earn   20
approximately 2% less (for high school graduates) and 1-2% less (for college graduates) for 
every extra year they take to graduate, whereas the corresponding estimates in table 4 (based on 
“highest grade completed”) lack statistical significance. 
In contrast, we believe “highest grade completed” is a more informative measure than 
“age at school exit” for both dropout categories.   Our goal is to measure the amount of school 
completed (i.e., credits earned) in order to control for heterogeneity in skill among individuals 
with a given nondegree status.  If reported accurately, “highest grade completed” is likely to be 
the preferred measure of schooling attainment for this purpose, given that future dropouts may 
“drag out” the time to school exit by failing courses, being truant, and otherwise spending time 
neither learning nor acquiring work experience.  We believe the estimated slope coefficients in 
table 4, which imply that both high school (college) dropouts earn 2-3% (3-5%) more for every 
year spent in school, are preferred for assessing the effects of time spent in school among these 
individuals.   
We can offer additional evidence to substantiate the argument that “age at school exit” is 
the preferred measure for degree-holders in the sense that it measures (inverse) innate ability, 
whereas “highest grade completed” is the preferred measure of skill and ability among dropouts.  
In 1980, over 90% of NLSY79 respondents completed the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB).  NLSY79 users have access not only to individual ASVAB scores, but also to 
scores for the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), which are computed from respondents’ 
scores on four parts of the ASVAB (word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, arithmetic 
reasoning, and mathematics knowledge).  Because AFQT scores are considered to be good 
measures of pre-market skills (Neal and Johnson 1996), we assess their correlation with both 
measures of time spent in school for each degree-specific subsample.
14  Among individuals in 
both degree categories, age-adjusted AFQT scores are strongly, negatively correlated with “age 
at school exit” but not with “highest grade completed.” Within both dropout categories, age-
adjusted AFQT scores are strongly, positively correlated with “highest grade completed,” 
whereas the correlations with “age at school exit” are small and negative for college school 
dropouts and zero for high school dropouts. 
6. Concluding Comments  
                                                 
14 Respondents’ ages ranged from 16 to 23 when the ASVAB was administered in 1980, so we use 
deviations between raw scores and age-specific means.    21
Our analysis begins with the observation that researchers often identify degree effects by 
controlling for both degree attainment (D) and years of schooling (S) in a wage model, despite 
the lack of compelling explanations for why these two measures of schooling attainment would 
vary independently.  We argue that individuals with a given degree are roughly homogenous 
with respect to acquired skill, but because the more able can earn their degrees relatively quickly, 
S is negatively correlated with innate ability among this population.  Conversely, individuals 
who drop out of a given degree program vary considerably with respect to both innate ability and 
acquired skill, and S is positively correlated with these traits.  Our simple extension of Card’s 
(1995, 1999) schooling model justifies the inclusion of both D and S in a wage model, and 
suggests that the effect of schooling on log-wages should be allowed to differ across degree 
categories. 
In estimating wage models that control for both D and S using data from the 1979 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we identify a number of patterns that are consistent with 
our model.  First, we find that the data resoundingly reject the restriction that the effect of “years 
of school” on log-wages is equal across degree categories—in other words, it is important to 
include degree dummies (D) and S-D interactions, rather than simply controlling for S and D.    
Second, our estimates indicate that additional time in school is associated with higher wages for 
high school dropouts and college dropouts, but with lower wages for high school graduates and 
college graduates.  Third, schooling effects for the two dropout categories are estimated more 
precisely when we use “highest grade completed” as the measure of S than when we use “age at 
school exit.”  For the two graduate categories, the opposite is true.  Fourth, our estimates prove 
to be largely invariant to our attempts to account for measurement error in self-reported S and D, 
which suggests that the independent variation in these two dimensions of schooling attainment is 
not dominated by “noise.” 
The fact that our alternative measures of time spent in school (“age at school exit” and 
“highest grade completed”) appear to capture different information for degree holders and 
dropouts is a useful finding in its own right.  We argue that high school and college graduates are 
expected to complete grades 12 and 16, respectively, and that, as a result, the age at which they 
earn their degrees is a more informative measure of ability than is their highest grade completed.  
Conversely, “highest grade completed” is a useful measure of progress made toward a degree 
among dropouts, whereas variation in “age at school exit” might reflect time spent neither   22
gaining work experience (which we are able to control for separately) nor learning.  Our 
estimates suggest that individuals within a given degree or dropout category vary considerably 
with respect to their ability and/or acquired skill, and that additional measures of schooling 
attainment are useful for explaining variation in post-school wages.  While ours is not the first 
study to view schooling attainment as a multi-dimensional construct, we suspect there is far more 
to be learned by exploring heterogeneity in completion patterns among individuals with a given 
level of schooling attainment. 
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Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Ln(average hourly wage)  1.81 1.09 2.23 2.02 
Highest grade completed (S1)   12.49 2.44 12.40 2.36 
Age at school exit (S2) 21.10 5.13 20.12 3.70 
Degree    
High school dropout (D1) .17 .17  
High school diploma (D2) .33 .37  
College dropout (D3) .34 .32  
College graduate (D4) .13 .13  
Graduate degree (D5) .03 .01  
Actual experience
a  2.74 4.02 9.21 6.88 
Early experience
b   .07 .23 .08 .27 
1 if male  .51 .53  
1 if black  .25 .27  
1 if Hispanic  .16 .18  
Number of observations  11,712  126,019 
Number of individuals  11,712  11,712 
aHours worked from 18
th birthday to date wage was earned, divided by 
2,000. 
bHours worked between 16
th and 18
th birthday.   
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18.3  6.6 9.8 4.6 6.1  19.5 
Note:  The table shows the number of sample members reporting each 
S-D combination.  Percents of column totals are in parentheses. 
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16.5 11.8 21.8 13.9 16.2 24.3 
Note:  The table shows the number of sample members reporting each 
S-D combination.  Percents of column totals are in parentheses 
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 Table 4:  OLS Estimates of Alternative Wage Models  
Using “Highest Grade Completed” as Measure of Time in School 














Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
  (6) (7) 
Degree  category         
High school dropout (D1) .191 .186 .169 .147 .168 .175  1.050 
 (.021) (.026)  (.028)  (.025) (.024) (.027) (.021) 
High school graduate (D2)  .196 .180 .185 .145 .166 .145  1.064 
 (.014) (.015)  (.014)  (.014) (.013) (.021) (.014) 
College dropout (D3)  .301 .293 .293 .252 .264 .296  1.197 
 (.014) (.015)  (.015)  (.015) (.015) (.015) (.014) 
College graduate (D4)  .462 .594 .594 .565 .612 .623  1.610 
 (.021) (.057) (.057) (.058) (.074)  (.078)  (.050)
Graduate degree (D5)  .615 .742 .742 .717   .741  1.716 
 (.037) (.031) (.031) (.031)   (.031)  (.029)
Time in school (S1)  .021       
 (.004)    
S1 interacted with     
High school dropout (D1)   .019 .016 .020 .020 .016 .028 
 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)  (.006)  (.005)
High school graduate (D2)   -.002  .006 -.002 -.002 -.012 -.014 
 (.009) (.007) (.009) (.009)  (.026)  (.007)
College dropout (D3)   .039 .039 .028 .040 .040 .053 
 (.006) (.006) (.007) (.006)  (.007)  (.005)
College graduate (D4)   -.015 -.015 -.016 -.014 -.028 -.023 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.018)  (.022)  (.013)
Number of observations  11,712 11,712 11,712 10,900 10,999  11,277  126,019
Note: Column 3 moves GED recipients from category D1 to D2.  Column 4 omits two-year 
degree recipients from category D3. Column 5 omits graduate school dropouts from 
category D4 and all graduate degree recipients.  Column 6 omits observations with highly 
implausible S-D combinations (see text for details).  Column 7 uses annual wage 
observations reported from school exit to the observation period’s end; for this sample, 
standard errors are corrected for nonindependence across observations for a given 
individual. Additional parameter estimates are reported in table A1.   33
Table 5:  OLS Estimates of Alternative Wage Models 
Using “Age at School Exit” as Measure of Time in School 












Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) 
Degree  category         
High school dropout (D1)  .114 .133 .120 .091 .131 .981 
  (.019) (.023) (.027) (.022)  (.021) (.020)
High school graduate (D2) .176 .136 .148 .107 .134  1.030 
  (.014) (.016) (.015) (.015)  (.015) (.015)
College dropout (D3)  .312 .299 .300 .253 .282  1.218 
  (.014) (.014) (.014) (.015)  (.014) (.014)
College graduate (D4)  .537 .560 .562 .533 .567  1.586 
 (.018) (.019) (.019) (.020) (.023)  (.018)
Graduate degree (D5)  .740 .713 .712 .667    1.705 
 (.031) (.035) (.035) (.035)   (.029)
Time in school (S2)  -.002      
 (.002)  
S2 interacted with     
High school dropout (D1)   .003 .001 .002 .006 .009 
 (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004)  (.005)
High school graduate (D2)   -.019 -.013 -.019 -.017 -.023 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)  (.003)
College dropout (D3)   .002 .002  -.001 .006 .001 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)  (.001)
College graduate (D4)   -.010 -.010 -.011 -.013 -.024 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)  (.003)
Number of observations
  11,712 11,712 11,712 10,900 10,999  126,019
Note: Column 3 moves GED recipients from category D1 to D2.  Column 4 omits 
two-year degree recipients from category D3. Column 5 omits graduate school 
dropouts from category D4 and all graduate degree recipients.  Column 6 uses 
annual wage observations reported from school exit to the observation period’s end; 
standard errors are corrected for nonindependence across observations for a given 
individual. Additional parameter estimates are reported in table A2. 
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Table A1:  Additional Estimates for Specifications in Table 4 
(“Highest grade completed” is used as measure of time in school) 
  
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Actual  experience  .058 .058 .058 .057 .062 .057 .062 
  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.001)
Actual  experience  squared -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.002 -.001 -.001 
  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Early  experience  .016 .016 .014 .015 .010 .014 .002 
  (.024) (.024) (.022) (.023) (.023) (.024) (.015)
1  if  male    .172 .172 .172 .177 .175 .173 .177 
  (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.007)
1 if black  -.063 -.065 -.063 -.063 -.063  -.063  -.100
  (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.008)
1 if Hispanic  -.000 -.002 -.001 .002 .000  .002  .014
  (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.010)
2
u σ   .200 .200 .200 .198 .191 .199 .274 
Note:  Each specification also includes calendar year dummies.     
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Table A2:  Additional Estimates for Specifications in Table 5 
(“Age at school exit” is used as measure of time in school) 
  
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) 
Actual  experience  .061 .061 .061 .061 .062 .062 
  (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.001) 
Actual  experience  squared -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.002 -.001 
  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Early  experience  .020 .022 .010 .021 .015 .005 
 (.024) (.024) (.022) (.023) (.023)  (.016)
1  if  male    .171 .171 .171 .177 .174 .177 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009)  (.007)
1 if black  -.063 -.061 -.061 -.059 -.061  -.095
 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010)  (.008)
1 if Hispanic  -.005 -.002 -.003 .011 -.001  .016
 (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012)  (.010)
2
u σ   .201 .200 .200 .198 .191 .274 
Note:  Each specification also includes calendar year dummies.     
 